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I.  Introduction
By Consuela A. Pinto
Family Responsibilities Discrimination: The Next Frontier
in Public Sector Employment Law
A school psychologist received out-
standing performance reviews until
she became a mother. She claimed
that she was denied tenure by
supervisors who allegedly told her
such as it was "not possible for [her] to
be a good mother and have this job,"1
and they "did not know how she could
perform her job with little ones."2  The
Second Circuit, reversing summary
judgment for the employer, held that
making stereotypical assumptions
about a mother's commitment to her
job is sex discrimination, even if the
mother does not have evidence that
similarly situated fathers were treated
differently.3
A maintenance employee, who was
the primary caregiver for his aging
parents, requested and received
intermittent FMLA leave.4. Shortly
after beginning his leave, his supervi-
sor implemented a new monthly
performance standard based on the
volume of work completed.5 The
employee, who previously had excel-
lent performance and received awards
for his work, could not meet these
performance standards.6 After 25
years of exemplary service, he was
terminated.7  The employee brought a
retaliation claim under the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and
prevailed by pointing to his history of
excellent performance, the timing of
the performance standard, and the
fact the standard was not applied
uniformly to all employees.8 The
evidence presented at trial indicated a
clear bias against caregivers on the
part of the supervisor and, by
implication, the employer.9  As a
result, the employee was awarded
$11.65 million.10
These are just two examples of the
current hot button issue in both public
and private sector employment law -
Family Responsibilities Discrimina-
tion ("FRD").  FRD is discrimination
against employees because of their
family caregiving responsibilities.
FRD cases encompass a wide range of
causes of action, including failure to
hire, failure to promote, denial of
benefits, denial of or interference with
FMLA rights, retaliation for exercis-
ing FMLA rights, hostile work
environment, retaliation, and wrong-
ful termination.  Because FRD claims
trigger a broad spectrum of causes of
action, they have been brought under
almost all federal employment stat-
utes including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,11   the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA"),12  Section
1983 and the Equal Protection clause
of the Constitution,13  Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),14  Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA),15
Equal Pay Act (EPA),16 and the
Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA).17 Employees have
also successfully used state anti-
discrimination and leave laws and
common law causes of action, such as
wrongful discharge, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and breach
of contract, to prove FRD cases.
The common thread linking all
FRD cases, regardless of the cause of
action, is the presence of unlawful
stereotyping. FRD occurs when em-
ployees suffer an adverse action that
affects the terms and conditions of
their employment based on
unexamined biases about how employ-
ees, both male and female, with family
caregiving responsibilities will or
should act.  Such biases or stereotypes
include assumptions that employees
with caregiving responsibilities are
unreliable, less committed, or less
productive.
There are a number of reasons for
the attention FRD has received
recently, including:  (1) a 400 percent
increase in the number of FRD cases in
the last ten years;18  (2) a 50 percent
success rate for plaintiffs,19 (3)
staggering damage and settlement
awards in the millions,20  and (4) the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) recent enforce-
ment guidance on caregiver discrimi-
nation (another name for FRD).21   T he
proliferation of these claims can be
attributed to such reasons as: the
availability of punitive damages under
Title VII, heightened awareness
among employees of their rights, and a
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greater desire for a work/family
balance.  However, the main contrib-
uting factor is FRD's link to family
values. Conservative and liberal
judges and jurors alike see FRD as a
threat to family values.
 This article begins with a discus-
sion of the role of stereotyping evidence
in FRD cases generally and sets the
stage for a review of the EEOC's
enforcement guidance on caregiver
discrimination.  The article presents
key cases and common causes of action
that have shaped the current status of
FRD law in the public sector.  The
article concludes with recommenda-
tions for employees, public agencies,
and their attorneys on how to
successfully litigate or avoid FRD
claims.
II.  The Role of Stereotyping
Evidence in FRD Cases
FRD discrimination arises when an
employer's actions are based not on the
individual employee's performance or
desires, but rather on stereotypes –
assumptions of how employees with
caregiving responsibilities will or
should behave. For example, a
supervisor may assume that a woman
with children will be less committed to
her  job and, as a result, reassign her
to a lower level position with less
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responsibility.  Similarly, a man may
be terminated because his employer
assumed that he would frequently
miss work because he cares for his
dying mother.  Generally, there is no
evidence to support these assump-
tions.
Many FRD plaintiffs prevail be-
cause they have a "smoking gun" in
the form of statements made by a
manager or others relating to the
characteristics of caregivers in the
workplace.  Examples of such smoking
gun comments from actual cases
include "your wife has to be in a coma
or dead before you can be the primary
caregiver,"22 and "working mothers
cannot be both good workers and good
mothers."23 Stereotyping evidence
coupled with a lack of evidence to
support the employers' assumptions or
to justify their adverse actions
generally spell disaster for employers.
The Supreme Court held gender
stereotyping unlawful in 1989 in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.24   The Court
held Price Waterhouse violated Title
VII when Hopkins was denied a
promotion because she was perceived
negatively for lacking stereotypical
feminine character traits. The Hopkins
court stated, “In the specific context of
sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive, or that
she must not be, has acted on the basis
of gender."25
In Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs,26 the Supreme
Court addressed caregiving stereo-
types in the context of the FMLA.
Then Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
for the Court, "The faultline between
work and family [is] precisely where
sex-based generalization has been and
remains strongest."27  He also noted:
"Stereotypes about women's domestic
roles are reinforced by parallel
stereotypes presuming a lack of
domestic responsibilities for men.
These mutually reinforcing stereo-
types created a self-fulfilling cycle of
discrimination. . . ."28
The decisions in Hopkins and
Hibbs led to the landmark FRD
decision, Back v. Hastings on Hudson
Union Free School District.29 The
Second Circuit in Back held that where
plaintiffs have evidence of gender
stereotyping, they need not put forth
comparator evidence, i.e. proof that
men with children were treated
differently, to prevail in a Title VII/
Section 1983 case.30  In so doing, the
court eliminated one of the most
difficult hurdles for FRD plaintiffs to
overcome.  True comparators often do
not exist.
The role of stereotyping evidence in
FRD cases boils down to two points.
First, stereotyping of caregivers is
gender stereotyping, which violates
the Equal Protection clause and Title
VII.  Second, the presence of gender
stereotyping evidence relieves plain-
tiffs of the burden of producing
evidence that comparable men with
children were treated more favorably.
As shown below, these two factors are
the tipping point in many FRD cases.
III.  Enforcement Guidance
on Caregiver Discrimination
In May 2007, the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion issued enforcement guidance
about disparate treatment of caregivers
in the workplace.31 The Guidance
made clear that federal anti-discrimi-
nation laws protect caregivers from
unlawful employment discrimination
even though caregivers are not an
expressly protected category. The
EEOC defined "caregivers" broadly to
include not only mothers but also
fathers, grandparents who care for
grandchildren and workers who
provide care for elderly parents or
disabled family members.  Further,
the EEOC picked up the theme of
stereotyping evidence in FRD cases
and explained that "[a]ll evidence [in a
caregiver discrimination claim] should
be examined in context.  The presence
or absence of any particular kind of
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evidence is not dispositive."32  Relying
on the decision in Back, the EEOC
reaffirmed the position that compara-
tive evidence is not necessary to
establish a violation because it has
long been held that employment
decisions based on stereotypes violate
the federal antidiscrimination stat-
utes.33   When an employer relies on
unsupported sex-based assumptions
or speculation instead of an employee's
actual work performance, it has
violated Title VII.34
The EEOC included a number of
examples and scenarios throughout
the 16 page guidance.  All public and
private human resource professionals
and employment attorneys should be
familiar with the details set forth in
the guidance. EEOC and, presumably,
individual agency's EEO investiga-
tors, will be taking a much closer look
at charges of discrimination involving
caregivers and applying the standards
set forth in the guidance.
IV.   Title VII and Section
1983 Claims
State and municipal employees may
bring FRD gender and pregnancy
discrimination claims pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as well
as Section 1983.35 Section 1983
provides that no person acting "under
color of state law" shall cause the
deprivation of rights and privileges
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to
any of its citizens.36   Section 1983 can
be used, among other things, to enforce
rights under the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Generally, the same methods of
proof and legal standards apply to both
Title VII and Section 1983 claims.
However, in addition to the elements of
proof in a Title VII claim, plaintiffs
bringing a Section 1983 claim must
prove that the harm they suffered was
the result of "state action."37  Such a
showing requires that the alleged
discriminators acted under the "color
of state law."38  In other words, they
abused the authority granted to them
by virtue of their position with a state
or municipal government.39
There  are  advantages to pursuing
a Section 1983 claim rather than or in
addition to a Title VII claim. For
instance, Section 1983 does not require
plaintiffs to exhaust administrative
remedies.40  Section 1983 actions are
governed by state statutes of limita-
tion pertaining to personal injury
claims, which are generally longer
than the 180/300 day limitations
period imposed by Title VII.41  Finally,
unlike Title VII, damages awarded in
a Section 1983 claim are not capped.42
Title VII is the exclusive remedy for
federal employees.  They may not take
advantage of the protections of Section
1983 because federal employers do not
"act under the color of state law."43
Further, federal employees must
adhere to different timelines and
procedures for filing a complaint under
Title VII than state or municipal
employees.44
A. Equal Protection
The Back case discussed above is a
landmark Section 1983 FRD decision.
Stating that "[i]ndividuals have a
clear right, protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, to be free from
discrimination on the basis of sex in
public employment,"45 the Second
Circuit ruled that making stereotypi-
cal assumptions about a mother's
commitment to her job is sex
discrimination, even if the mother
does not have evidence that similarly-
situated fathers were treated differ-
ently, and contravenes the Equal
Protection Clause.46  The Back decision
was a turning point in FRD law
generally and in the role of stereotyp-
ing evidence specifically. Every em-
ployer and management attorney
faced with an FRD action will have to
grapple with the Back holding.
Knussman v. Maryland47 is an-
other example of the Equal Protection
Clause at work in an FRD case.  In
Knussman, a Maryland state trooper
was awarded more than $665,000 in
damages and attorneys' fees and costs
in a case brought under Section 1983,
the Equal Protection clause, and the
FMLA, to challenge the denial of his
nurturing leave request as a "primary
caregiver" after the birth of his child.48
Maryland law permitted a state
employee to use paid sick leave for
reasons other than the employee's own
illness, including "for death, illness or
disability in the employee's immediate
family."49 Knussman's wife was
bedridden as a result of complications
related to childbirth. Accordingly,
Knussman, who had ample sick leave,
requested four to eight weeks of paid
leave to care for his wife and newborn
daughter, but was given only two
weeks of leave.50
While on leave, Knussman was
performing the essential duties in
caring for his newborn daughter —
changing diapers, feeding, bathing,
and taking her to doctor visits.51
During the leave period, Maryland
enacted a statute the allowed the use of
paid sick leave by state employees to
care for their newborns.52 The statute
permitted "primary care givers" to
"use, without certification of illness or
disability, up to 30 days of accrued sick
leave to care for a child . . .
immediately following . . . the birth of
the employee's child."53  The statute
defined "primary care giver" as "an
employee who is primarily responsible
for the care and nurturing of a child."54
By contrast, "a secondary caregiver
was an employee who is secondarily
responsible for the care and nurturing
of a child" and might use up to 10 days
of accrued sick leave.55
Pursuant to the new Maryland
statute, Knussman requested an
extension of his leave on the basis that
he was the primary caregiver for his
child.56   His request was denied.57  The
Human Resources Department ex-
plained that the State Police Depart-
ment interpreted that definition of a
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"primary caregiver" to include women
only.58 The Human Resources repre-
sentative went so far as to state, "God
made women to have babies and,
unless [the plaintiff] could have a
baby, there is no way [he] could be a
primary care [giver]."59   She also told
Knussman that his wife needed to be
"in a coma or dead" for him to qualify
for extended leave.60
Knussman claimed that his leave
request was denied as a result of
gender discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  The court
stated that "[g]overnment classifica-
tions drawn on the basis of gender have
been viewed with suspicion for
decades"61 and that "a gender classifi-
cation is subject to heightened
scrutiny and will fail unless it serves
an important government objective
and [is] substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."62
The Fourth Circuit held that the
Department's interpretation of "pri-
mary caregiver" did not serve an
important government interest; rather,
it was simply an invalid gender
classification based on stereotypes.63
B. Title VII Disparate Treat-
ment
Attorneys have relied on Title VII more
than any other statute when challeng-
ing employers' alleged unfair treat-
ment of family caregivers in the
workplace. Title VII disparate treat-
ment claims are by far the most
common type of FRD action.64
A common scenario for an FRD
Title VII claim is where a female
applicant is asked whether she has or
plans to have children and, if so, how
she will manage her work responsibili-
ties.  Once such case is Barbano v.
Madison County,65 where the plaintiff
applied for a position as the director of
the county veteran's service and was
interviewed by a panel.  During the
interview, Barbano was asked about
her plans to have a family and whether
her husband would object to her
transporting male veterans.66
Barbano objected to these the
questions on the basis that they were
discriminatory.67 However, the inter-
viewer required her to answer, stating
that the questions were relevant
because he didn't want to hire "some
woman" who would just get pregnant
and quit.68 The other interviewers
allowed this line of questioning to
continue.69  Although the plaintiff was
considered qualified for the position,
the county ultimately selected a male
applicant.70
The court found that the questions
asked of the plaintiff were clearly
discriminatory and unrelated to a
bona fide occupational qualification.71
Further, the plaintiff was asked only
one question related to her qualifica-
tions for the position.72 The discrimi-
natory questions were essentially the
entire interview. All of the other
interviewers acquiesced to the dis-
criminatory behavior and voted in
favor of the male applicant. Given the
evidence and the county's stipulation
that the plaintiff was qualified for the
position, the Second Circuit affirmed
the trial court's verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.73
Sivieri v. Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, Department of Transitional
Assistance74 is a classic example of
another type of Title VII FRD case,
where an employer takes an adverse
employment action based on stereo-
types about what working mothers
want and don't want in a job.  Sivieri
alleged that she was passed over for a
promotion while pregnant and that a
less-qualified female with no children
was selected.75   Indeed, the position
was given to an employee that Sivieri
had trained.76 When she returned
from maternity leave, Sivieri noticed a
negative attitude against women with
small children.77 Her supervisors and
managers often made derogatory
comments about women with young
children and the negative effects of
having women employees bearing
children.78  One supervisor even stated
that the "the unit would remain
effective 'as long as nobody else g[ot]
pregnant.'"79
Sivieri eventually received a promo-
tion, but so did more junior employees
without small children.80  When
Sivieri asked her manager why she
had been repeatedly passed over for
promotions, he told her that the
managers assumed she wasn't inter-
ested in promotion now that she was a
mother.81 Further, the manger stated
that he was "surprised she was upset
at not getting promoted, considering
her family obligations at home."82  He
also explained that the more junior
employees without small children
were promoted because they could put
in extra hours.83
Sivieri alleged that she was
"discriminated against . . . based on a
gender stereotype, namely, the belief
that a woman cannot be both a good
mother and a committed worker."84
Sivieri's claim presented an issue of
first impression under the Massachu-
setts anti-discrimination law.  Accord-
ingly, the court turned to Title VII
precedent for guidance. The court
primarily relied on the Price
Waterhouse, Hibbs, and Back deci-
sions discussed above.85  In so doing,
the court held that "stereotypical
remarks about the incompatibility of
motherhood and employment can be
evidence of gender discrimination . . .86
Basing employment decisions on
such sex-based overgeneralizations
constitutes gender discrimination . . ."
Consequently, the court denied the
defendant's motion for summary
judgment.87
C. Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion
All pregnancy discrimination cases by
their very nature are FRD claims.
Pregnancy discrimination cases may
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be brought under Section 1983 as well
as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA").
The PDA states that "women
affected by pregnancy . . . shall be
treated the same . . . as other persons
not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work."88  The
PDA "addresses the stereotype that
women are less desirable employees
because they are liable to become
pregnant" and "insures that the
decision whether to work while
pregnant [is] reserved for each
individual woman to make for
herself."89   Therefore, an employer
cannot take adverse action against a
pregnant employee "because it antici-
pated that she would be unable to
fulfill its job expectations."90
A typical pregnancy discrimina-
tion case arises where the plaintiff
alleges that she was terminated
because of her pregnancy. For
example, in Suarez v. Illinois Valley
Community College,91   the plaintiff
was terminated from her secretarial
position ten days after she informed
her supervisors that she was preg-
nant.  Suarez alleged, among other
things, that she was terminated in
violation of the PDA as well as Section
1983 and the Equal Protection clause.
In addition to the timing of her
termination, Suarez submitted evi-
dence that one of her supervisors, upon
learning of plaintiff's pregnancy, said
"here we go again."92  The supervisor
who made the statement explained in
his deposition that "if he made that
statement it was probably because the
pregnancy would mean they would
need to replace the plaintiff.93
In response to plaintiff's allega-
tions, the defendants argued that
Suarez was terminated because she
was not qualified for her position and
the decision to terminate her was
made before she announced her
pregnancy.
The court rejected the defendant's
first argument, because the plaintiff
relied on the direct method of proving
discrimination and, therefore, her job
performance was irrelevant.94 With
respect to the defendants’ timing
defense, the court found that the
supervisor's derogatory statement and
deposition testimony coupled with
discrepancies in the defendants'
testimony relating to the timing of
their decision to terminate Suarez
created a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the court denied
defendant's request for summary
judgment on plaintiff's Title VII PDA
claim.95
 Another typical pregnancy dis-
crimination claim is harassment or
hostile work environment. In Borchert
v. State of Oklahoma,96  the plaintiff
alleged that her relationship with her
supervisor deteriorated after she
informed her supervisor of her
pregnancy.  Specifically, the supervi-
sor rolled her eyes and congratulated
Borchert in a “hateful manner” when
she announced her pregnancy.  After
learning of plaintiff's pregnancy, the
supervisor refused to consult with her
on issues relating to the child care
center where she worked, allowed
other employees to make harassing
comments regarding her pregnancy,
harassed plaintiff publicly, and reas-
signed plaintiff's administrative re-
sponsibilities to other employees who
were not pregnant.97 Disparaging
comments regarding plaintiff's severe
and ongoing nausea occurred on a
daily basis.  Plaintiff further alleged
that her supervisor told her to “get
over it” and said that “she wasn't
really sick.”98
The situation was exacerbated
when the plaintiff   began to experience
complications and went on FMLA
leave.  Shortly after returning from
leave, Borchert provided a doctor's
note imposing a twenty-pound lifting
restriction.  Defendants told Borchert
that she could not perform the
essential functions of her position with
such a restriction.  Borchert argued
that because she worked with the
newborns, the weight restriction was
not an issue.  Defendants disagreed
and terminated her.99
The court found that the com-
ments were both pervasive in that they
occurred multiple times each day and
severe because they were “highly
insensitive and likely exacerbated the
distress created by plaintiff's compli-
cation-ridden pregnancy.”100 The court
also found it persuasive that  Borchert's
supervisor made the derogatory
comments and that she did so in front
of other employees.  Accordingly, the
court found that plaintiff put forth
sufficient evidence of a hostile work
environment based on her preg-
nancy.101
A less common pregnancy dis-
crimination claim is one where the
plaintiff alleges that she was discrimi-
nated against because she may become
pregnant. In Walsh v. National Com-
puter Systems,102 the plaintiff,  an
account representative, put forth
considerable evidence that during and
after her pregnancy she was subjected
to chronic and severe harassment by
her supervisor.103  The court found
sufficient evidence that Walsh was
discriminated against because she
was pregnant and may become
pregnant in the future.  In so doing,
the court affirmed the jury's verdict
for the plaintiff.
D.  Retaliation
The Supreme Court's definition of
"adverse action" in Burlington North-
ern and Santa Fe Railway Company
v. White (BNSF),104    will play a critical
role in FRD law.  There, the Court
rejected the requirement imposed by
some circuits that the adverse action
be related to employment in order for
the plaintiff to prevail in a retaliation
claim.105  The Court also established
the level of adversity necessary to
make out a case of retaliation.  Noting
that Title VII's anti-retaliation provi-
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sion does not protect from all
retaliation but only from retaliation
that causes harm, the court set the
following standard:  "a plaintiff must
show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged
action materially adverse"106  in light of
the particular circumstances sur-
rounding the action, which means
that the challenged action "well might
have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.'"107 Accordingly, the
Court's holding eliminated the protec-
tion previously provided to employers
by judicial decisions holding that a
lateral transfer, under any circum-
stance, is not a materially adverse
action.108
To demonstrate how circum-
stances play a role in retaliation cases,
the Court used an example of a
caregiver situation, saying that a
schedule change may ordinarily
matter little to an employee and thus
would not be materially adverse, but to
a mother with school age children, a
schedule change could "matter enor-
mously" making the change a
materially adverse action.109   In so
doing, the court expressly adopted the
Seventh Circuit's findings in Wash-
ington v. Illinois Department of
Revenue.110
In Washington, the plaintiff, a
female manager, complained of race
discrimination.  She had been working
a flexible schedule in order to care for
her son, who had Down's Syndrome.
In retaliation for her complaint, her
employer moved her to another
position with the same title, pay, and
duties, but a standard schedule.  The
Seventh Circuit held that while a
lateral transfer to a substantially
similar position is not ordinarily an
adverse action, for the plaintiff, the
change was significant and thus
supported a claim of retaliation.111
V.  FMLA Claims
Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA") cases, like pregnancy
discrimination cases, always qualify
as FRD claims.  FMLA FRD cases
typically arise when an employee
seeks leave to care for a newborn or
recently adopted child or a seriously ill
family member.  Private sector as well
as state, municipal, and non-civil
service federal employees are covered
by Title I of the FMLA, which provides
eligible employees with a private right
of action. However, federal civil
service employees are covered by Title
II of the FMLA, which does not include
a private right of action.  Accordingly,
federal civil service employees may not
recover damages against the federal
government for violations of the
FMLA.112
A.  Interference Claims
The FMLA provides that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any employer to interfere
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of
or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided under this title."113 An
employer interferes with an employee's
rights under the FMLA by refusing to
authorize leave, discouraging an
employee from taking leave, shorten-
ing the length of leave and considering
the taking of leave as a negative factor
in employment actions.114
A common fact pattern in an FMLA
interference claim is where the
employer fails to inform the employee
of his or her FMLA rights, thereby
denying the employee's right to leave.
When the employee becomes aware of
his right to FMLA leave, the employer
states that it is "too late" to request
leave. For example, in Williams v.
Illinois Department of Corrections,115
plaintiff's mother became ill from
kidney failure, obesity, high blood
pressure and diabetes.  As a result,
Williams decided that he needed to
move in with his mother to take care of
her for an undetermined period of
time.116  Because Williams did not have
sufficient leave time accrued, his
supervisor told him that his only
option was to resign.  Relying on the
supervisor's advice, Williams ten-
dered his resignation.  That evening,
while reviewing his employee hand-
book, Williams came across the
agency's FMLA policy.117
The next day when Williams asked
to withdrawn his resignation, his
supervisor told him that he was too
late.  His resignation had already been
passed on to the central office.  The
central office, however, did not process
Williams' resignation until more than
two weeks later.118
In response to Williams' FMLA
interference claim, the Department
argued that plaintiff was not entitled
to FMLA leave because he failed to
provide adequate notice as required by
the collective bargaining agreement
("CBA").  Williams' did not submit his
request in writing at least 30 days in
advance of his need for leave and he did
not provide enough information to
place the Department on notice that he
may be entitled to leave.119
The court had a very different view.
It found that a reasonable jury could
find that Williams was entitled to
FMLA leave even though he did not
give proper notice under the
Department's CBA.  Williams' failure
to comply with notice provisions was
likely due to the Department's
interference with his attempt to take
leave.  Further, during his conversa-
tion with his supervisor, Williams
provided sufficient information about
his mother's illness to indicate that
she suffered from a serious health
condition. Further, Williams was
clearly inquiring about leave.120
B.  Retaliation Claims
The key element in an FMLA
retaliation claim is a causal link
between protected FMLA activity and
an adverse employment action.121
Perhaps, one of the most widely
publicized (and costly for the defen-
dant) FRD FMLA retaliation cases
was Schultz v. Advocate Health
discussed at the beginning of this
7Winter 2008IPER REPORT
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A more novel retaliation case
involves the relationship between the
employee and the person for whom he
or she cares.  In Dillon v. Maryland-
National Capital Park and Planning
Commission,123   the plaintiff requested
three weeks leave, to be taken at the
end of December to take a family
vacation to Jamaica where several of
her relatives lived.  Her request was
denied. In November, she re-submit-
ted the same request which was again
denied, but she was offered leave from
December 12 through December 20.124
On December 19, Dillon e-mailed her
supervisor from Jamaica stating that
her grandmother had sustained a
small stroke a few days before she had
arrived and she now needed to stay.125
Dillon was terminated when she
returned to work.126
As the FMLA does not allow for
leave to care for a grandparent, the
plaintiff could only have been entitled
to FMLA leave if her grandmother
stood in loco parentis to her.127   Dillon
asserted that her grandmother "basi-
cally raised [her]," provided for her
financially as a child and gave her a
home at the age of 16, when her own
mother kicked her out of their house.128
The court held that the evidence
created a triable issue as to whether
the plaintiff was entitled to FMLA
leave, but it was not so conclusive as to
require a finding, as a matter of law,
that her grandmother stood in loco
parentis to her.129    Therefore, both
parties' motions for summary judg-
ment as to the FMLA claim were
denied.130
VI.  Americans with Disabili-
ties Act’s Association Clause
The association clause of Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA")131  protects employees
who care for a person with a
disability.132  Courts have applied this
statute to conclude that an employer
may not refuse to hire an applicant
because the applicant has a disabled
child.133    A major hurdle for plaintiffs
in utilizing the association clause of
the ADA is that the family member
needing care must be an individual
with a "disability" as defined by the
ADA.134  An individual is "disabled"
under the ADA if the person has a
"physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities" of such
individual, "a record of such an
impairment," or been "regarded as
having such an impairment."135
Despite this hurdle, plaintiffs have
used the association clause to
challenge adverse employment actions
based on their caregiving responsibili-
ties.136
VII. Executive Order 13152
Executive Order 13152, signed by
President Clinton in 2000, amends the
Equal Employment Opportunity in
the Federal Government provision
created by Executive Order 11478 to
prohibit employment discrimination
against federal employees based on
their "status as a parent."137  The
Executive Order "does not confer any
right or benefit enforceable in law or
equity against the United States or its
representatives."138   Aggrieved par-
ents therefore cannot file a complaint
with the EEOC or bring a direct
judicial action.  The administrative
EEO complaint procedures of federal
agencies are the only avenue of relief
available to federal employees who
believe they have been discriminated
against because of their parental
status.
VIII.  State Causes of Action
State causes of action provide yet
another avenue of relief for both public
and private sector FRD plaintiffs.
Many states' anti-discrimination laws
provide protections and remedies for
FRD plaintiffs that are equal to or, in
some cases, broader than those found
in Title VII.  Alaska and the District of
Columbia provide particularly strong
protection for FRD plaintiffs because
their anti-discrimination statutes
expressly prohibit employer practices
that affect workers on the basis of
parental status or family responsibili-
ties.139  The Illinois Human Rights Act
does not expressly include "family
responsibilities" or "familial status"
among its list of protected catego-
ries.140   However, Administrative Code
5210.80 defines "sex discrimination"
as including the restriction of
employment opportunities of women
with minor children.141
State family and medical leave laws
are also potential bases for FRD
claims.  Some state leave laws are
identical to the federal FMLA, while
others provide broader protections.
Pursuant to state law, public
employees in Illinois are entitled to the
same coverage as is provided by the
FMLA, with the added option to extend
the leave period up to six months at the
discretion of the Auditor General.142
Finally, common-law actions have
also been used to challenge adverse job
actions taken because of an individual's
family responsibilities. Among the
most typical common law claims,
where recognized, are: (1) wrongful
discharge;143   (2) intentional infliction
of emotional distress;144   (3) implied
covenant of good faith and fair
dealing;145  (4) tortious interference
with contract;146 and (5) breach of
contract.147
IX.  Conclusion
The numerous variations in FRD
claims make these cases particularly
challenging to prove as well as defend.
Agencies and their attorneys need to
have effective prevention programs in
place.  Training of managers about
stereotypes of caregivers and how they
lead to FRD claims is essential, as
shown by the smoking gun state-
ments.  In addition, prevention should
include a review of all relevant
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employment policies and actions for
possible FRD liability.  Adding "family
responsibilities discrimination" to
existing anti-discrimination policies
and incorporating information about it
into the agencies' trainings may help
avoid punitive damages.
Lessons from the case law help
plaintiff's attorneys as well.  Adding
FRD fact patterns to their case
screenings can help them identify
potential FRD cases that otherwise
might be missed.  Premature losses
can be avoided by making sure that the
correct causes of action are pled.
Finally, being prepared to educate
EEOC and agency investigators,
judges and juries about what FRD is
and how it plays out in the workplace
can help strengthen your case. ?
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In Niles Township High School
Dist Dist. 219 v. IELRB, 2007  WL
4410683 (Ill. App.1st Dist. Dec. 17,
2007), the First District Appellate
Court held that nontenured, proba-
tionary teachers who were dis-
missed were not entitled to binding
arbitration because their  collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") ex-
pressly limited their appeal process.
In addition, the court held that the
union's claims regarding the use of
improper evaluation procedures
prior to the dismissals did not have
support in the CBA.
In April 2007, the school district
notified three, non-tenured proba-
tionary teachers that their con-
tracts would not be renewed for the
following school year. The union
filed grievances on the teachers'
behalf challenging this decision.
After reviewing the grievances, the
school district denied them, and the
union demanded arbitration. How-
ever, the school district refused to
engage in arbitration, claiming the
parties' CBA specifically provided
that decisions to dismiss nonten-
ured teachers were not arbitrable.
In response, the union filed a charge
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with the IELRB. The union contended
that it had grieved the school district’s
failure to comply with procedural
requirements of the CBA relating to
teacher evaluations and personnel
files, and not the actual decision to
dismiss the teachers. The union
argued that the former issues were
subject to arbitration under the CBA.
The administrative law judge agreed,
and the IELRB accepted the ALJ's
recommendation.
Reviewing the case de novo and
considering all documents produced
during the investigatory stage of the
IELRB proceeding, the First District
examined whether the union's allega-
tions stated an arbitrable claim under
the CBA. After reviewing the appli-
cable sections of the CBA that the
union claimed the school district
violated, the court held that nowhere
in the CBA was it required that the
school district take specific procedural
steps before dismissing nontenured
teachers. The court stated that the
only limitation on the school district's
discretionary authority in this matter
would be those limits established by
law, and the union did not allege that
any laws had been violated. In
conclusion, the court stated that
procedural steps for evaluation of
nontenured teachers could have been
required as part of the CBA, but the
procedural steps the union claimed
were required here were in fact not
required under the plain language of
the CBA. The court concluded that the
matter was not arbitrable.
In Flora Community Unit School
District No. 35 and Unit No. 35
Teaching Assistants Education Asso-
ciation, IEA/NEA, Case No. 2007-
RM-0001-S (IELRB 2007), the IELRB
considered Flora Community Unit
School District No. 35's petition,
brought under Section 7(c)(2) of the
IELRA, questioning the majority
status of an incumbent exclusive
bargaining representative, Unit No.
35 Teaching Assistants Education
Association, IEA/NEA.  After consider-
ing the stipulated record and appli-
cable president, the IELRB granted
the District's request and ordered an
election.
The IELRB found that when the
Association was certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative in
1999, there were 15 employees in the
bargaining unit.  Since 1999, however,
there was a steady decline in the
number of employees paying Associa-
tion dues, with only one employee
requesting a payroll deduction for
Association dues since the 2004-2005
school year. On June 18, 2007, the
Association did inform the District
that it had three dues paying members
who would represent the Association
in the negotiation of a successor
collective bargaining agreement.
The District filed a petition seeking
an election under Section 7(c)(2) of the
IELRA.  Section 7(c)(2) authorizes an
employer representation petition where
the employer "doubts the majority
status of an exclusive bargaining
representative. TheIELRB interpreted
section 7(c)(2) by looking to analogous
authority under the National Labor
Relations Act. In Allentown Mack
Sales and Service, Inc. v. NRLB, 522
U.S. 359 (1999), the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's re-
quirement that an employer have a
good faith reasonable doubt of a
union's continued majority status to
mean objective evidence giving rise to
a reasonable uncertainty.  The IELRB
adopted this standard to section
7(c)(2). The IELRB held that the
decline in the number of Association
members to the point where most of
the bargaining unit were not members
gave rise to a reasonable uncertainly
concerning the Association's contin-
ued majority support.
Board Member Michael H. Prueter
dissented.  He would have found that
there did not exist reasonable good
faith uncertainty regarding the
Association's majority status.  Prueter
noted that many employees might
approve of the Association but, for
other reasons, decide not to lend the
Association their financial support.
Therefore, he would have dismissed
the employer's petition.
IPLRA Developments
Bargaining Units
In Illinois Nurses Association and
State of Illinois, S-RC-07-036 ILRB
State Panel 2007), the ILRB State
Panel reversed and Administrative
Law Judge's recommended decision to
dismiss a petition filed by the Illinois
Nurses Association ("INA"). The INA
sought to represent exclusively a unit
of six Public Service Administrators
("PSAs") employed by the Department
of Healthcare and Family Services'
Office of Inspector General's Bureau of
Administrative Litigation. The State
of Illinois claimed that the petitioned
for unit was not appropriate and that
the members of the unit were
managerial and, thus, excluded from
collective bargaining under the IPRA.
The State Panel reversed the ALJ's
decision to dismiss the INA's petition.
First, the Board examined the
State's claim that bargaining unit
was inappropriate under section 9(b)
of the Act because the proposed unit
was too narrow. Section 9(b) looks at
the following factors to determine the
appropriateness of the bargaining
unit: "historical pattern of recogni-
tion; community of interest including
employee skills and functions; degree
of functional integration; inter-
changeability and contact among
employees; fragmentation of employee
groups; common supervision, wages,
hours and other working conditions of
the employees involved; and the
desires of the employees." The Board
Employee Representation
Petitions
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found that while the fragmentation
factor favored dismissing the petition,
it was the sole factor leaning towards
dismissal. That factor, alone, was
insufficient for a finding of dismissal.
Thus, the Board reversed the ALJ's
finding of inappropriateness.
Next, the Board examined the
State's claim that The PSAs were
excluded from bargaining because
they were managerial. Section 3(j) of
the IPLRA defines "managerial"
employee as one "engaged predomi-
nantly in executive and management
functions and is charged with the
responsibility of directing the effectua-
tion of management policies and
practices." Illinois courts have devel-
oped a two-part test to determine if
individuals are managerial: 1) is the
employee engaged in executive/man-
agement duties and 2) does the
employee direct the effectuation of
management policies and functions?
Meeting the first prong requires
the employee possess independent
authority and judgment to "broadly
effect" the organization. The second
prong requires the employee have
discretion to determine how policies
will be effected. While PSAs used
professional discretion and technical
expertise, professional employees are
not the same as managerial employ-
ees. There was no evidence the
employees possessed sufficient inde-
pendence and responsibility to effectu-
ate policy as required by the Act. So,
contrary to the ALJ's recommenda-
tion, the Board found that the PSAs
were not managerial under 3(j).
Contract Bar Rule
In Policemen's Benevolent Labor
Committee v. City of Perkin, Case No.
S-RC-07-112 (ILRN State Panel 2007,
the State Panel affirmed the ALJ's
decision to order a representation
election among certain city police
officers who were already represented
by the incumbent union, Fraternal
Order of Police ("FOP").  The Board
ordered the election over the city's
objection that the collective bargain-
ing agreement between the FOP and
the City barred a representation
petition. The agreement stated that it
"shall be effective from May 1, 2003,
and shall remain in full force and effect
until April 30, 2007." Thus, under
Section 9(h) of the Act, because the
charging party filed the representa-
tion petition between 60 and 90 days
prior to the April 30 Agreement
expiration date, the petition was
timely filed.
The FOP and City argued that
because the Agreement was extended
by amendment to April 30, 2009, the
representation petition was not timely
filed. However, the Board explained
that when, prior to the window period,
the parties extend an Agreement
beyond the terminal date of the
existing contract, the extension does
not bar an election on a petition filed
during the original window period.
Thus, the agreement extension here
did not bar the charging party from
filing a representation petition. This
rule protects the employees' right to
choose another bargaining representa-
tive over the stability of contract.
The City also argued that employees
in the rank of sergeant must be barred
from organizing under the Act's
exception for supervisors. The Board
rejected this argument outright,
explaining that the sergeants at issue
here had been organized for nearly
twenty-one years. Thus, "the
Employer's action in this regard not
only undercuts greatly the credibility
of its supervisory contention, but also
is an apparent violation of Section
10(a)(1) of the Act."
EDITOR’S  CORRECTION:
In our prior issue, volume 24, number
4, Fall  2007, the article, Psychological
Evaluation in Labor Arbitration by
Sara D. Jay and Patricia J. Aletky
contains an error. Page 3, column 3
reads, “The MMPI-2 is a checklist filled
out by the subject...” It should read,
“The MMPI-2 is a questionnaire...” We
apologize for the error.
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